

RESULTS-BASED FINANCING TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF (WASH) PROGRAMMING

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INTRODUCTION

- What is results-based financing?
- Transfer of money or material goods conditional on:
 - taking a measurable action or
 - achieving a predetermined performance target
- It differs from traditional expenditure-reimbursement financing

INTRODUCTION

Payment Date	Payment	Milestone or	Due by	Reporting Period	Payment Date	•	Milestone or	Due by	Reporting Period
	Amount	Deliverable				Amount	Deliverable		
August 2014	Up to	Annual Narrative and	June 15, 2014	May 15, 2013	August 2013	\$2,693,921.00	Annual Narrative and	July 30, 2013	May 15, 2012
	\$1,623,215.00	Financial Report,		through May 14,			Financial Report		through May 15,
		evidence satisfactory to		2014					2013
		the Foundation that the							
		Project is providing							
		sustainable sanitation							
		services to at least 60%							
		of 270,000 residents							
		and sustainable water							
		services to at least 60%							
		of 100,000 residents,							
		each as set forth in the							
		Proposal, including							
		satisfaction of the							
		performance indicators							
		set out therein and							
		financial report							
		•	•						

INTRODUCTION

"Human ingenuity – when given proper incentives – is bound to be larger"

STEVEN D. LEVITT

- While RBF may not be suitable for every financing, considering its use is worthwhile
- The devil is in the details, i.e. in the implementation of RBF
- So here are some short lessons from good and bad practices

LESSONS OVERVIEW




Figure 1 – Conceptual framework

GOALS: WHAT DOES THE FINANCING WANT TO ACHIEVE?


- Increase utilization
- Sustainability
- Scale
- Policy Change
- Innovation
- Strengthen Local Institutions
- Understand for which category(ies) of goals, will payment based on results induce additional effort
- Understand for which category(ies) of goals, will payment based on results will not induce additional effort
 - Outcomes hard to measure/verify
 - Risk is too high (i.e. upstream research)
 - Influence of external factors is too high

GRANTEE: WHO IS BEST SUITED FOR RBF FINANCING?

- Capacity of a grantee to work within RBF structure:
 - Ability to take risk
 - Ability to pre-finance
- What are the long term implications for selecting such grantees?

GOVERNANCE: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT?

• It is important to structure the RBF such that all the entities whose effort is directly connected to outcomes is incentivized: RBF trickle down



GOVERNANCE: WHO REPORTS TO WHOM?

- Avoid conflicts of interest generated by RBF
 - When the prime grantee competes with sub-grantees for the same RBF, while also controlling levers that all
 partners rely on to succeed such as procurement, maintenance, budget approval, disbursement of funds
 - When a grantee is responsible for reporting results while also being incentivized to achieve the same results

INDICATORS: SELECTING INDICATORS TO LINK TO PAYMENT

- Precisely define indicators avoid any ambiguity
- Reward a small number of high impact indicators
- Select indicators that the grantee can influence, within the period of the grant
- Select indicators that are independent of each other
- Avoid the possibility of gaming
- Avoid indicators that impose a certain path for the grantee
- Consider ease of verification

TARGETS: DECIDING WHAT IS GOOD PERFORMANCE

- Reward the achievement of pre-defined performance targets whenever possible
 - What if not enough information is available?
 - Consider target setting rules rather than actual targets
 - Combine minimum targets with per unit payments
- Performance targets should be challenging yet feasible
- Consider building flexibility into agreements if external factors play an important role
- Provide room for early failure in grants that aim to promote innovation

VERIFICATION: MAKING SURE REPORTED PERFORMANCE IS REAL

- Verification should build upon the grantee's own monitoring data
- Consider using technology to document evidence of achieved results
- Understand incentives of verifier (and counter-verify)
- The rigor of verification should take into account the non-monetary incentives for accurate data reporting
- Impose penalties on grantees for misrepresentation (and have a dispute mechanism)
- Compare the cost of verification to the expected impact of the grant rather than to the grant ceiling

PAYMENT

theory of change funding activities results performance indicators ← real? - % extra? competitive or – % withheld? your guaranteed? grant Cost \$ X non-PBI per milestone, revenues \$YPBI → per target, & other per unit? funding? payments readiness/ upfront amount innovation? investment phase/reward phase frequency duration of grant?

Figure 3 – Underlying characteristics of a PBI mechanism

PAYMENT

- Consider moving away from paying based on inputs where possible
 - This does not eliminate the possibility of upfront payments
- Consider what will motivate the desired change in behavior
 - Withholding payment or bonus payments?
- Annual payment of incentives is better than only at the end of the grant
- Clearly specify the payment rules in the grant agreement
- Understand grantee preparedness and ability to prefinance

ANTICIPATE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

- Negative
 - Multiple donors
 - Multiple outcomes
 - Achieving results vs. strengthening local institutions
 - Gaming
 - Supplier-induced demand
 - Thwarting innovation
- Positive
 - Improved outcome monitoring systems
 - Reduced grant management effort